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The Public-Private Good Intentions
Forum: Randomize Behavior
Robert Wood
Public andprivate institutions ofhigher learning coexist throughout the United States in a
pattern ofdiversity that is unknown in any otherpostindustrial society—and Massachu-
setts is a prime example of U.S. pluralism in education. In an era ofscarce resources and
mounting costs, the contrary instinctsfor cooperation and competition are at work. This
article is an account ofa voluntary attempt among private andpublic colleges and univer-
sities between 1973 and 1976 toforge afragile partnership—the Massachusetts Public-
Private Forum—which firstflourished, thenfoundered. Tracing the course of its early
successes andfinalfailure may help shape present education policy, as Massachusetts
tries tofind a common groundfor a partnership between the public andprivate sectors.
Always pray that your opposition be wicked. In wickedness there is a strong strain
toward rationality. Therefore there is always the possibility, in theory, of handling the
wicked by outthinking them.
Corollary One: Good intentions randomize behavior.
Corollary Two: Good intentions are far more difficult to cope with than malicious
behavior.
—Marion J. Levy, Jr.
Laws ofthe Disillusionment ofthe True Liberal
The institutional mosaic by which the United States educates its young is one of the
great unnatural wonders of the world. In so-called plain education—kindergarten
through twelfth grade—some 16,000 local education authorities in the public sector co-
exist with 3,600 private schools. In higher education, 1,700 public universities and col-
leges stand alongside almost 1,400 private colleges and universities, although three out of
four students in the nation attend public institutions.
The extraordinary mix of public and private institutions stands in sharp contrast to the
national structure of education common in all other so-called advanced nations. Foreign
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visitors looking at our array of schools and colleges, observed the late James Bryant Co-
nant of Harvard, often conclude that "this is not a system, but chaos." To which Conant
replied, "But it works; most of us like it; and it appears to be as permanent ... as most
of our political institutions."'
Apparently, permanent coexistence among separate parties implies some sort of contin-
uing interaction among the several parts. Sometimes it takes the form of collaboration, as
in the work of the College Board, which serves as gatekeeper in the transition from school
to college. More often today, as college costs soar and the college-age cohort in the popu-
lation dwindles, competition is the principal feature of the relationship. Every year, private
colleges unwillingly expire, having blamed their demise on the public sector. Independent
universities vie with public ones in the search for research funds. Public and private ad-
mission offices engage in "marketing strategies" to attract the best and the brightest.
For a generation, state governments have struggled, with uneven success, to put in place
coordinating and governing boards that could rationalize the missions and better allocate
resources between the public and private sectors. Professional associations have worked
to fashion arrangements that at least provide rules of the road in the contest for students
and money. Independent universities and colleges, fearing government "intrusion," and
public ones jealous of the historic prestige of elite private institutions and suspicious of
their claim on publicly supported student aid occasionally try their hand at treaty making,
bringing to mind the "spheres of influence" strategy of colonial empires.
In no state has the battle between the public and private institutions of higher education
raged more fiercely than in Massachusetts. The concentration of first-rate, prestigious
private universities and colleges is greatest here. Public institutions are Johnny-come-
latelies compared to their Midwest and western counterparts. They play catch-up with all
the vigor, brashness, and occasional crudity that mark newcomers to an enterprise. If
there is a laboratory to test the prospects for collaboration, to determine the costs of un-
bridled competition, and to explore the feasibility of comprehensive education oversight
and planning, short of state domination and dictation, it is the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts.
This is a report on one such experiment that took place in the Massachusetts laboratory
about a decade ago. The article was prepared initially for the Alden Seminars, a group of
leaders in education, business, and industry who meet to discuss major issues in higher
education and to identify areas for action and possible solutions for problems. The discus-
sion treats the experience of the Massachusetts Public-Private Forum, a voluntary cooper-
ative endeavor among public and private institutions of higher education that flourished,
then foundered in the years 1973-76. The Forum's purpose was to forge a common front
for higher education in the state, presenting a united claim in the allocation of scarce
resources during a time when those resources were increasingly hard to come by. Its
members, in the overwhelming majority, were men and women of good will and high
professional capabilities who increasingly came to respect and like one another. In two
important instances, the Forum achieved consensus on important policy matters. Then it
fell apart, even while similar associations in other states—such as New York, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania—held together. The question is, of course, why?
What follows then, drawn from imperfect documentation and more imperfect memory,
is a plausible but not definitive reconstruction of the rise and fall of the Massachusetts
Public-Private Forum. Successive sections characterize the environment in which higher
education operated in the mid-1970s, and the key features of the system of higher educa-
tion then. They trace the evolution of the Forum with at least chronological accuracy,
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describing its climb to the mountaintop of the "spirit of Williamstown" and the descent to
the Worcester massacre. The last sections suggest reflectively what went wrong and what
lessons there are for today. But the reader must remember that these conclusions are those
of a workaday political economist temporarily posing as a historian and painfully aware of
how the historian would judge the effort.
The Environment: The Dreary Seventies
All through the sixties, higher education in Massachusetts was on a roll. Enrollments
swelled as postwar baby boomers came of age. Federal support for research and develop-
ment, the student aid programs of the Great Society, liberal state appropriations for public
institutions, and the first sizable endowment drives for many private ones provided suffi-
cient and occasionally ample resources. Civil-rights legislation released the pent-up col-
lege demands for minorities. Capital outlays for new campuses, classrooms, and labora-
tories were often authorized even before architects completed plans. The times were
golden.
However, foresighted observers such as Joseph Healey, chairman of the University of
Massachusetts Board of Trustees, knew that the bloom was coming off the rose. By the
end of the decade, continued student protests over Vietnam and inept academic responses
to them startled a public once wholeheartedly committed to education, then soured it. The
Columbia University riot in 1968, the Harvard Bust in 1969, the march on MIT's Draper
Labs in 1969, Kent State in 1970, and the resulting campus upheavals across the country
signaled an abrupt halt in the academic march to a bigger and better promised land. These
events distracted academic administrators from ordinary concerns. They diverted all
energies to the simple maintenance of law and order and to damage control of a public
opinion increasingly confused and outraged at the turn of events.
Unlike Joseph Healey, most college and university leaders were slow to recognize the
changing times. Preoccupied with the tasks of restoring campus peace, sorting out student
demands, and reuniting fiercely divided faculties, academic leaders missed even more
fundamental and ominous signs. The first of these was simply the change in demography:
the smaller numbers in the college-age cohort of the population. The baby boomers had
passed through the pipeline; the baby-boom "echo" was fifteen years away. The second
indication lay in the public consequences of an older population: the new priority to be
given the post-65-year-old cohort, the most rapidly growing group of dependents. The
third was inflation, resulting inescapably from the way in which the Vietnam War had
been financed and from the emergence of genuine foreign competition in major sectors of
the U.S. economy. Rarely disposed to plan ahead in any event, academic administrators
still had their attention riveted on getting through each week's crisis, and seldom per-
ceived the new forces at work.
By 1973, on top of the downswing in the economy, the effect of the new forces had been
further intensified by the recognition of resource scarcity— or, in Dennis Meadow's felici-
tous phrase, "the limits of growth." 2 International economic problems proved unrespon-
sive to wage or price freezes and a floating dollar; a full-blown recession followed. Even
before the onslaught of the OPEC energy crisis, the Keynesian consensus that the national
economy could be deftly managed to control business cycles was becoming unglued. "Stag-
flation" became a phenomenon economists had difficulty explaining.
Not surprisingly, the political mood turned sour. A strange Cromwellian spirit settled
in— puritanical, simplistic, niggardly, mean-spirited, essentially anti-intellectual, basi-
cally anti-institutional. In Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis campaigned on the promise of
no new taxes, relying somewhat naively on increased productivity from an executive
branch never known for its managerial competence or efficiency. Once in office, he
would face an apparently intractable deficit, and public education, midway through its
long-term capital outlay program, would be instructed to slash 30 percent from its out-
lays—operating expenses and capital. Healey's admonition that the bloom was off the rose
was painfully confirmed.
In October 1973, Gladys Hardy, former under secretary of education in Massachusetts,
submitted her first interim report as director of the Public-Private Forum. Hardy summed
up the situation in her classically understated way:
The venerable privately sponsored institutions in Massachusetts felt the economic
pinch and were sensitive to the dangerous ways in which competition might increase
between the public and private sectors to the detriment of all higher education. The
publicly sponsored institutions, begun slowly and late in receiving substantial invest-
ments, had not yet reached the goals of those investments and commitments of the 60's
and were sensitive to the potential of restraint on the realization of these objectives.
The System
In Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, a provocative treatment of
organization theory, Charles Perrow distinguishes between simple and complex systems
according to the number of their components and how they are coupled to one another, in
"loose" or "tight" ways. 3 In 1973, the Massachusetts higher education system clearly
qualified as complex—many components, loose couplings. The Association of Indepen-
dent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts (AICUM) then had fifty-eight members,
ranging in nature from the great research universities, such as Harvard, to two-year junior
colleges, such as Bay Path. The public system organized by the Willis-Harrington legisla-
tion during the expansive mood of the mid-sixties ("let every college bloom") consisted of
three universities, one with three campuses; twelve state colleges, most of which were in
the process of transforming themselves from teacher-training institutes; and twelve newly
established community colleges. Each university and the two other segments were run by
separate, gubernatorially appointed boards of trustees. A Board of Higher Education
(BHE), composed of representatives of the public universities and colleges, one private
citizen, and a labor representative, presumably oversaw the public system.
By statute, the BHE was authorized to develop a master plan for higher education, to
coordinate the programs of the public institutions, to approve new programs, and to re-
view budgetary requests. But the board itself never obtained from the legislature a budget
or staff that was sufficient to carry out these responsibilities. Further, its early leadership
was viewed as biased toward the University of Massachusetts, and its program and budget
reviews quickly became pro forma. Most public institutions simply ignored its pronounce-
ments.
The BHE's own role was compromised in 1971 by the awkward presence of a secretary
of educational affairs, a position that had been established as part of an extensive reorgan-
ization of state government. This reform was designed to streamline the executive branch
and to provide the governor with a cabinet that had line authority over previously quasi-
independent departments and agencies, tied together by a sophisticated computer-based
information system (which was never installed). 4 The office of the secretary of educa-
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tional affairs had been created apparently without considering the existence of the Board
of Higher Education, and the result was considerable duplication of statutory authority
and responsibilities. Despite a thoughtful memorandum by Paul Cooke, a Harvard Busi-
ness School consultant who argued that the secretary's role was principally an advisory
one, each body viewed the other with suspicion.
Both the private and public higher education systems then were "soft systems," the
institutions within each only loosely coupled together. They relied mainly on voluntary
collaboration as they faced the hard problems that changing demography and economic
recession imposed on them. Between the two sectors, collaboration was visible only at
specific geographical locations where common curricula and student needs were obvious:
the Five Colleges, Inc. , in the Lower Pioneer Valley; the Worcester Consortium for
Higher Education; the Southeastern Association for Cooperation in Higher Education in
Massachusetts (SACHEM); and the Boston Eight.
The Boston Eight consisted of universities offering doctoral graduate programs in the
Boston metropolitan area. It came about on the initiative of three academic presidents:
Father Seavey Joyce of Boston College, Asa Knowles of Northeastern, and the author,
then of the University of Massachusetts. Meeting periodically in the Captain's Room at
the Algonquin Club, the Eight managed to publish a report on the contributions made by
higher education to Boston's economy. After that, the exchange of views among strong
personalities at close quarters made for poor chemistry, and the tentative confederation
fell apart over the issue of federal aid to education.
Beset by conflicting demands from the public institutions and facing an experienced
professional, Joseph Cronin, as the first state secretary of educational affairs, BHE chan-
cellor Pat McCarthy called for outside help. The BHE and Secretary Cronin cosponsored
three major studies by recognized consultants: the Academy for Educational Development
(AED), University Consultants, and the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation
(OSTI). Lacking real authority over either budget or planning, McCarthy could only hope
that among academic leaders presumably committed to rational thought, reason would
prevail as these empirical and logical studies went forward. Actually, such was the frag-
mentation and disparity among public institutions that neither he nor Secretary Cronin
had any option.
The Public-Private Forum: (1) The Beginnings
Don Schon, an MIT behavioral scientist, was president of OSTI and the principal investi-
gator for a BHE project titled "A Master Planning Process for Higher Education in
Massachusetts." A veteran evaluator of Great Society programs, Schon was process-
oriented. He believed that no single master plan would be able to gain the support of all
the institutions affected. After collecting data about higher education in the state, and then
projecting trends, Schon advocated a "negotiation-bargaining" planning process, a proto-
type for efforts known as public-private partnerships that were to become fashionable in
1980 research circles.
It was under Schon's auspices that the first three meetings of the Public-Private Forum
took place, in February, March, and May of 1973, and it was his agenda that initially
shaped the Forum's work. Considerable preparatory work for both the public and private
sectors was completed prior to the February meeting. (Each sector met separately three
times to determine its positions on policy issues that might arise. Obviously, sovereign
suspicions ran high.) The Forum members present at these meetings were the Executive
10
Committee ofAICUM, for the private sector, and the operating heads of the public uni-
versities and state and community colleges.
These early sessions provoked considerable claims throughout the higher education
establishment, as well as considerable concern. Members of the BHE worried that the
Forum could preempt the board's statutory authority. Public-segment executives at the
campus level were suspicious that their leaders would "give the store away" to the private
sector. For their part, private institutions believed that the Forum might be a stonewalling
device to allow public capital-outlay programs to go forward under the cover of deliber-
ately protracted discussions and debates. An exchange between Father John Brooks, pres-
ident of Holy Cross, and the author at the November 1973 meeting on the subject of
Brooks's proposal to freeze public capital-outlay appropriations was representative of
some sharp questioning of motives and good faith that occurred in almost every session.
So was an exchange of letters in November and December 1973 between the author and
John Adam, then chairman of the BHE, over the same issue. 5
Given this atmosphere of suspicion, the Forum commissioned the author and President
Burton Hallowell of Tufts to elaborate its form and functions. The two presidents were
cautious. They provided a set of guidelines and asserted that the collaborative effort was
essential, then went on to say it would be "inappropriate ... to recommend an ultimate
organizational location." Further, they stressed that "the aegis of a lay decision-making
policy body representing the citizens' interest" was essential. The principal aim of the
report was to lay to rest the image of an informal establishment elite bent on back-room
domination of higher education.
These early meetings of the Forum produced some workmanlike procedural results.
Four working bodies were formed: the Equal Opportunity Pool (EOP) group; the Com-
mittee on Graduate and Professional Education; the Student Aid Committee (later to be
combined with the Equal Opportunity Pool); and the Information Committee (planning
data and cost reporting).
During the summer of 1973, the committees went to work. Then, on November 12,
1973, a full-blown session, with twenty-five participants, took place at Emmanuel Col-
lege. Its purposes were to hear Schon's final report and the progress reports of the stand-
ing committees and to approve another committee on capital outlay. At the meeting on
December 11, a seven-person Executive Committee was established, with John Adam as
chair (thus removing some of the BHE's concern about a competitive enterprise); the
secretary of educational affairs was invited to be on the committee as a nonvoting member
(thus damping his concern). Twelve votes were authorized for Forum membership: five
for public CEOs, five for AICUM presidents, one for AICUM, and one for the BHE.
Bylaws were drawn up, a mission statement was approved, and a three-quarters majority
vote was established as a prerequisite for Forum approval of any major policy.
With committees in place, structure and voting requirements established, and doubts
assuaged, the Forum appeared to be in business.
The Forum: (2) Hard Work and Tortured Consensus
Throughout the winter of 1973 and the spring of 1974, the Forum met monthly, alternat-
ing between private and public campus sites, where hospitality ranged from lavish spreads
of spirits and food to send-out sandwiches (on the occasion when the host Forum member
forgot to inform his campus of the meeting). The sessions focused primarily on the com-
mittee reports, increasingly on the report of the Equal Opportunity Pool Committee,
11
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which was chaired by Peter Edelman, then vice president of the University of Massachu-
setts. This committee was charged with shaping a substantial financial aid program that
would be fair to both sectors. Essentially, the program turned on fixing a differential in
awards for financial aid between the two sectors, which would acknowledge the difference
between public and private tuitions and therefore allow students to make approximately
cost-neutral choices.
The heavy EOP debate was further complicated by technical considerations such as the
calculation of federal aid, family support, and loans. It was also handicapped by the intro-
duction of extraneous issues. For example, midway in the deliberations, Lawrence Den-
nis, CEO for the state College Board, announced a new "open university" program that
he was to oversee and that would report directly to the governor. Throughout February
and March of 1974 the debate went on, with Edelman providing successive revisions of its
contents.
Then, during the meeting of April 8, after eloquent advocacy by President George
Hazzard of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, the Forum adopted the EOP program and
agreed to seek gubernatorial and legislative support. The program totaled $35 million and
provided up to $2,000 for private-sector scholarships, capping public scholarships at
$1,000 and guaranteeing that 80 percent of the total scholarship funds would be directed
to the private sector. In Hazzard's opinion, the proposal "moved toward equalization" and
deserved "a common front." On May 22, 1974, the Forum had the satisfaction of seeing
the proposal incorporated in House No. 6094, with a special message recommending it by
Governor Francis Sargent. 6
The Forum: (3) High-Water Mark—The Spirit of
Williamstown
By the beginning of the summer of 1974, the Forum was buoyed by the production of a
tangible and important piece of legislation, by the presence of a senior staff member in
Gladys Hardy, and by a Ford Foundation grant to underwrite a summer conference. (The
grant had been secured by Frank Tredinnick, executive director of AICUM, and by Father
Michael Walsh, then academic adviser to the University of Massachusetts.) At Williams
College at a three-day seminar in July 1974, the Forum went public. In fact, the seminar
was a summit meeting, carefully planned and structured by Hardy, Walsh, and Tredin-
nick. It brought together all the Forum members, along with eleven other presidents of
private and public institutions. Presidents John Silber of Boston University, John Chan-
dler of Williams, and Father Don Monan of Boston College were there for the private
sector. President Robert Leestamper of Worcester State College, President Don Walker of
Southeastern Massachusetts University, and Dennis were major spokesmen for the public
sector. All but the most amply endowed private universities were represented, and the
most anxious private and least-known public institutions were there in force.
Howard Bowen, the nationally known education economist, chaired the seminar. Fred
Glimp, director of the Permanent Charity Fund (now the Boston Fund), and Leroy Grea-
son, dean of Bowdoin, were rapporteurs. A carefully prepared agenda began with initial
position papers by the author and Knowles, moved systematically through the major is-
sues provoked by enrollment and financial trends, then concluded with a plenary session.
In the elegant ambience of the Williams Elm Tree House, and prodded by skillfully
persistent staff, the seminar found common ground for public-private trade-offs that were
consistent with the priorities of each sector. An Executive Committee meeting midway
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through the seminar nailed down the specifics of a common statement, and the plenary
session offered a surprisingly eloquent endorsement. The two essential parts of the bar-
gain were Forum support for the constitutional amendment (Article 46), then pending
before the voters, which would allow state aid for the private sector; and Forum agree-
ment that low tuition would continue for the public sector.
Other provisions in the package were a commitment to planning that would be both
comprehensive and "open" (that is, planning in which the two sectors would share infor-
mation—a departure from past procedure); support for the EOP pending legislation; and
a "no diversion" pledge to ensure that private aid would not reduce support to the public
institutions. But these were good-will generalities. The real agreement was an exercise in
distributive politics—both sectors anticipating increments to their resource positions
heretofore denied them.
John Adam expressed the delight and surprise of all participants when he wrote on July
1 1 that the "tone or spirit," "attitudes and feelings," and concrete written agreement all
represented a "landmark in the development of public-private cooperation." The mem-
bers departed aglow with the spirit of Williamstown.
The Forum: (4) Committees in Trouble and Purple Prose
The glow lasted throughout the 1974 academic summer, and the two autumn meetings
went well. Glimp agreed to become Forum chairman. The body reviewed its mission and
reaffirmed its independence; and it was gratified by a reaffirmation of support from the
BHE. It also began to benefit from frank, informal exchanges, in the discussion of
AICUM's forthcoming legislative program and in the debate over contrary proposals for
veterinary medical education. (The Forum ultimately endorsed the contract plan of the
New England Land Grant Universities, instead of a free-standing veterinary school.) A
senior staff transition from Hardy to Henry Kriebel, president emeritus of Babson Col-
lege, went well.
But trouble loomed regarding the work of the Committee on Graduate and Professional
Education and the Information Committee. In 1974, Dean Robert Alberty of MIT, chair of
the Committee on Graduate and Professional Education, had reported the committee's
difficulty in obtaining reliable information, especially in engineering. He had distributed
a questionnaire to participating institutions. Returns had been few. Now, on March 25,
1975, his committee made no substantive recommendations and suggested that regional
groups be established to review new graduate programs proposed by any institution. The
Forum discharged the committee with thanks.
The Information Committee was in deeper difficulty. Under the leadership of Warren
Gulko, director of institutional research at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, it
had embarked on an ambitious and technically complex analysis involving comparative
cross-institutional costs of individual academic departments. The study cost money, and
$16,000 was scrounged from various college budgets. But Forum members—Silber and
Father Monan of Boston College especially—had raised questions both as to design and
utility. And there was general apprehension on the part of private institutions about dis-
closing financial information.
Further, the Information Committee found it difficult to apply national statistical for-
mats such as the Higher Educational General Information Survey (HEGIS) to the Massa-
chusetts scene. Problems of definition hampered its work. So did the failure of
participating institutions to report promptly. 7 In March this committee was also dis-
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charged with thanks, although in June 1975 the Forum was to try again by authorizing a
$9,000 study by Newhauser, Frantz, and Corsirie, to be completed by October 1975. That
work also foundered as a result of difficulty with the data. Without tangible substantive
recommendations from these committees, the Forum essentially marked time.
In the meantime, the spirit of Williamstown seemed to be disappearing. Hardy had
warned that it was "precious, though fragile and tenuous." Now, on November 15, 1974,
the BHE recommended higher public tuitions, and on December 18, the author wrote a
sharp letter of protest to McCarthy, complaining that the board's action was contrary "to
both the spirit and the specific recommendations of the Williamstown meeting." Kriebel
observed diplomatically in his final report of April 18, 1975, as his contract expired, that
"the quality of the Forum meetings has not been consistent" and that "the composition of
the agenda has a substantial bearing on the quality of the meeting." Seeking to regain
momentum, the Forum ventured another Williamstown-style meeting, this time at Holy
Cross, on April 29, 1975.
As in Williamstown, the Holy Cross meeting was sponsored by the Ford Foundation,
but this time the meeting did not work. For one thing, it was only a day in duration, and
for another, almost one hundred CEOs, trustees, and staff were involved. Father Walsh
gave a splendid address, and T. Edward Hollander, deputy commissioner from New York,
reported on that state's experience, emphasizing the institutional aid that the "Bundy
money" provided. He deemed it essential that higher education speak with "one voice." 8
A question-and-answer period ensued, followed by a press conference at the end. Father
Walsh called for a master plan, but no formal statement was issued.
The Forum: (5) Disaster at Worcester
After the Holy Cross meeting, the paper trail of Forum activities largely disappears.
Kriebel executed the cost study contract, and in October 1975 the contractors reported
their inability to establish reliable comparisons. By December, the AICUM files focused
almost exclusively on correspondence with the Ford Foundation, in which an effort was
being made to reconcile expense vouchers. There are references to an occasional meeting
of the Executive Committee in Adam's offices in Worcester. But there is no report of any
agendas or of full Forum assemblies, if they were held. Ken Ryder, newly appointed pres-
ident of Northeastern, did host a meeting at Henderson House in the winter of 1975. No
minutes of the meeting emerged because, as Ryder recalls, "There was nothing to record."
The drop-off in recorded activity is not surprising. The real, if somewhat hidden,
agenda at Holy Cross was to discover whether a genuine master-plan effort could be
launched, with the necessary data made available and competent professional staff as-
signed. That issue had not been resolved, and neither BHE nor Ford Foundation funding
was now available.
Meanwhile, the economic and political environment had worsened. The effects of the
OPEC oil crisis were everywhere, as inflation quickened and fuel costs threatened the
budget of every campus. The Dukakis administration persevered in trying to impose
across-the-board cuts in funding for public higher education. It also proposed a morato-
rium for the opening of the new medical school facilities at Worcester, and impounded
capital-outlay funds for such projects as a new gymnasium at the Boston campus of the
University of Massachusetts. Scholarship funds were cut, and private and public institu-
tions alike were engaged in struggles for economic survival.
Increasingly, the public sector became preoccupied with fighting off Governor Duka-
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kis's austerity proposals and what it perceived to be a frontal attack on fiscal autonomy.
The BHE and the new state secretary of educational affairs, Paul Parks, seemed more and
more to behave like two scorpions occupying the same bottle. Chancellor McCarthy of the
BHE departed for Maine, and other public CEOs slipped away. Finally, the public sector,
with the support of Senate president Kevin Harrington, undertook a major reorganization
of its structure, aiming to distance itself from gubernatorial direction and to establish a
strong central board with genuine budgeting and planning authority. By early spring of
1976, the fight for the reorganization against gubernatorial opposition was consuming
most of the public sector's energy and attention. 9
Nonetheless, through the good offices of Glimp, Adam, and Tredinnick, it was deter-
mined that at least one more major effort should be made. On March 26, 1976, forty-six
CEOs and their staff assembled at the Worcester Medical Center, appropriately enough,
as it turned out, in the surgical amphitheater. The aim was to come to grips with the spe-
cifics of a master plan: what the plan would be, who would write it, and how it would be
financed. Shortly after the meeting began, however, President Silber of Boston University
made an eloquent but intemperate defense of the independence of the private sector, and
attacked the wastefulness and redundancy of the public institutions. From the floor, Presi-
dent Bartley of Holyoke Community College and Chancellor Bromery of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst responded in kind. Charges and countercharges resounded
through the amphitheater with growing intensity. The meeting bogged down in yet another
technical cost discussion, producing more glazed eyes than conclusive articulation. The
opportunity to present a specific policy proposal vanished.
Instead, the CEOs in attendance issued a seven-point statement calling for a strength-
ened BHE, with more private representation, and suggesting that the role of the secretary
of educational affairs be "reexamined." The statement encouraged "voluntary" coopera-
tion and coordination but through regional and area consortia, and sought to distinguish
between lay-board governance and the planning function. Its only specific positions were
a defense of the fiscal autonomy of state institutions and a declaration that "neither the
executive branch nor elected officials should have line authority in the governance of
higher education."
Not a single resolution emerged concerning the role of the Public-Private Forum or
what it should do next. The attendees simply straggled out, to repair in cliques and
caucuses at nearby bars and restaurants. The Forum did not meet again.
Analysis: What Went Wrong?
The Forum achieved consensus on two significant policy matters—the EOP and the Wil-
liamstown agreement. Why, then, did the undertaking ultimately fail? As one sifts
through the record, two sets of answers suggest themselves: internal and external. Gener-
ally speaking, internally the relative strengths of the two sectors were uneven, not so
much in the aggregate as in the respective positions of universities, liberal arts colleges,
and two-year institutions. Externally, the Forum faced not only a difficult economic envi-
ronment (as did the other states), but also an especially adverse political environment
—
one with little tradition for recognizing the autonomy of any institutions that sought
substantial public resources.
In elaborating on the internal properties of the Massachusetts education system, one
observes the following. First, the sheer number of institutions and their diverse character
made a coherent structure hard to come by. Approximately eighty separate private institu-
15
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tions existed in Massachusetts in the 1970s, each with its own board of trustees and each
committed to institutional survival. Twenty-five public universities and colleges were
involved. Their character and quality varied wildly, not only in the two-year/four-year/
graduate divisions, but in special foci, origin, and sponsorship. To engage them all, or,
more important, to have each perceive that its interests were being fairly represented in
the Forum would have been an extraordinarily difficult achievement of statesmanship
even in prosperous times.
Second, the private sector had special characteristics, as T Edward Hollander had
pointed out at Holy Cross. More than other states, Massachusetts draws a large propor-
tion of its students from out of state. The more prestigious the college or university, the
less it depends upon either public or private state resources. So Harvard, MIT, Amherst,
Williams had no direct concern with the Forum's condition, save in a public relations way.
Indeed, the experience of the Boston Eight made plain that the heavy hitters tolerated the
game only as long as it seemed pleasant. When they withdrew, they suffered no conse-
quences. The active private participants in the Forum were the hungry universities. They
were frequently of high quality, but state aid meant a great deal to them, and their compe-
tition with the public sector was very real. What these institutions lacked in prestige and
clout, they made up in contentiousness.
Third, the public sector was in no better shape. Operating at the end of the Great Leap
Forward decade, its segments were designed to operate independently, preoccupied with
completing major expansions for which the commitment in bricks and mortar had already
been made. Most important, public-sector institutions suffered from a historical inferior-
ity complex vis-a-vis their private counterparts. In actuality, the public community col-
leges were in far better circumstances than the private junior colleges, and the University
of Massachusetts was achieving national status. But their administrations found it hard to
believe in themselves. This second-best attitude made them street fighters too, as much as
their hungry private counterparts.
Fourth, this complicated, weak, and loose array of institutions functioned with an ap-
palling lack of knowledge about themselves or each other. The experience of the Informa-
tion Committee demonstrated how crude and error-prone the data base for policy-making
was, and few institutions had competent planning staffs. Throughout the Forum's exist-
ence, the simple absence of facts plagued its deliberations and encouraged judgments
based on rumor, false assumptions, and vague generalizations. The presence of two able
senior staff directors could not compensate for this fundamental deficiency.
As for characteristics of the external environment, the "outside" political system was
ill-disposed to support higher education, especially public higher education, for several
reasons. First, the coordinating mechanisms that existed were flawed and redundant. The
composition of the BHE was heavily weighted toward the public sector, and the private
institutions both resented and were suspicious of the board. Further, the board had no real
authority; it could review, comment, and recommend programs and budgets, but it could
not mandate them. When the office of the secretary of educational affairs was introduced
as an extraneous by-product of the statewide reorganization plan, confusion and uncer-
tainty were compounded. The first secretary, Joseph Cronin, appeared often to heed the
injunction of consultant Paul Cooke to function in an advisory and consultative fashion,
but his successor, Paul Parks, showed no such disposition. If ever there was a fifth wheel
in governmental structure, it was the secretary's office. (This mistake was acknowledged,
and the office was abolished in the 1979 reorganization legislation for higher education.)
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Second, the higher education system never achieved genuine autonomy with respect to
the larger state political system. The private sector was never really dependent on public
resources, nor was it critically influential in the political process, for it always resisted
financial disclosure, a prerequisite for institutional aid. It sometimes had marginal influ-
ence, as with scholarship programs, but on major issues such as the establishment of a
state medical school, it lost. The public sector had won considerable statutory autonomy
in the sixties, but the continuation of that autonomy turned on legislative sufferance usu-
ally evident in nonacademic patronage accommodations. Some governors exercised self-
restraint in trustee appointments, but by the mid-seventies, that restraint had vanished; in
its place, a conscious strategy of oversight and control had emerged.
Third, the severe economic recession, the energy shortage, and the faltering public
faith in the value of higher education encouraged and magnified media cynicism. This was
expressed in such headlines as "College: Who Needs It?" and served to create a mood of
growing pessimism. Educators were no longer respected public figures. They were ad-
vised by their business and political counterparts to "hunker down," not to make waves,
not to try.
Fourth, both the public and the private educational institutions tended to align them-
selves with broader political ideologies, which led to confrontational postures not relevant
to the common cause. Public educators often preached a populist doctrine, portraying
themselves as the guarantors of education for the "common people" and offering access
to the first-generation college-bound. Private educators often responded by suggesting
that their institutions were superior in terms of quality and purity of motives. In the
speeches and behavior of both, one could detect the ghosts of the Jefferson-Hamilton
debates.
Contemporary political analysis categorizes public policies in four ways: constitutional
(changing the rules of the game); regulatory (imposing restraints on individual or collec-
tive behavior); distributive (providing benefits to a majority); and redistributive (provid-
ing benefits to one group at the cost of another). Clearly, as a voluntary, consensus-based,
and confederate organization, the Forum could not aspire to constitutional or regulatory
policy. It could—and did—advance distributive policy, functioning as a potentially power-
ful interest group that could influence but not mandate public policy. Given the centrifugal
forces at work within the higher educational system (lacking the cohesion and discipline
of an industry association or a trade union) and the centripetal forces of the outside politi-
cal system (the gubernatorial drive for dominance engendered by a deteriorating econ-
omy), redistributive policy-making was beyond the Forum's capability. It was one bridge
too far.
Put another way, as long as the public and private sectors in education regarded them-
selves as more dissimilar than alike, they could negotiate, as Schon urged them to do, but
they could negotiate only treaties. They did so in the EPO program and at Williamstown.
In these instances, each party expected to gain in an anticipated distribution of additional
resources—joint scholarships, a constitutional amendment for the private sector, contin-
ued low tuition for the public sector. This was akin to incremental budgeting, a non-zero-
sum game. A treaty could be made.
However, when the two sectors were asked to agree to a master plan that assigned dis-
crete missions and a reallocation of resources, the load became too heavy to carry. True
enough, the Forum entered a partial no man's land, created by an ineffective BHE and a
loose-cannon secretary's office, but occupying that territory required a disciplined force
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to engage in redistributive policies, in hard times taking from one and giving to another.
This is the hardest kind of politics to play, and it is not surprising that the Forum was not
up to it.
So at Worcester, the sectors parted company in a curiously inconsistent way. On the one
hand, the Forum asked the larger political systems to undertake the redistributive task
through a stronger lay board. On the other hand, it argued for grassroots voluntary re-
gionalism, apparently assuming that things would go better at the local level even though
resources were more scarce. The Forum was unanimous only in its admonition to politi-
cians to keep their hands off its precious, if fragmented, enterprises. No politician, espe-
cially in Massachusetts, would be likely to take that counsel as anything but a confession
of failure. Accordingly, two years later, in an off-budget section of the state appropriations
act, the Board of Regents was established.
Lessons for Our Times
Ten years after the demise of the Forum, the environment for higher education in Massa-
chusetts is sharply different. The flood tide of reports indicates that higher education is
once again on the public agenda, that a window of opportunity has been opened after a
decade of being shut. Massachusetts is booming economically, and a powerful education
lay board is in place. Ironically, the issue of private-public representation is now reversed.
This circumstance is made plain by the aftermath ofJames Collins's appointment and by
the legislative override of Governor Dukakis's veto of the new conflict-in-interest law. 10
What is intriguing in the present situation is that the arena for resolving in-house competi-
tion among public and private educational institutions is now the Board of Regents. Ab-
sent a public-private forum, there is nowhere else for that issue to go. What the Forum
protested against, even as it dissolved, is now reality.
Could a reconstituted Forum recapture that arena on the grounds that academic
autonomy and independence are at risk today, to the detriment of both public and private
universities and colleges? The contemporary experience of five other states offers at least
a partial answer.
In 1985, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) stud-
ied patterns of collaboration in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, and
New York—and found the prospects encouraging. The AGB's special report, Cooperation
and Conflict: The Public and Private Sectors in Higher Education, observes first that
historically there have been more shared interests and values than differences." It points
out that in the eighties, far more than they did in the seventies, both sectors rely on the
same three major sources of institutional funding: fees, gifts and endowments, and federal
and state aid. Both have the same interest in federal and state tax codes. Sabers continue to
rattle, the report states, as in the half-cost battle with federal Pell grants, but the danger of
a preemptive strike by one sector or another seems to have diminished in the past ten years.
Specifically, after presenting the five case studies, the AGB suggests that well-struc-
tured, well-staffed, joint state associations can successfully advance common funding
programs, and have done so. This is the so-called linkage strategy of tying support for
private institutions to a percentage of public appropriations, thereby ensuring a rising tide
to float all boats. Such state associations can engage and have engaged in contractual
agreements among each other, as in the Ben Franklin Partnership in high-tech regional
centers and in the Illinois Higher Education Cooperative Act. They can cooperate and
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have clearly cooperated on student financial aid. These policies seem transferable to
Massachusetts.
Finally, the AGB recommends that lay governing boards recognize the importance of
intersector relations and that all parties seek the "high road" of cooperation instead of
sending out "hard ball" signals. 12 It suggests that boards should encourage state associa-
tions of higher education and enhance support of their activities. It endorses the linkage
formula for appropriations, anticipating that private institutions will have to acknowledge
general oversight of their programs. Observing candidly that the possibility of civil war
exists, the association goes on to opt for the civility of enlightened self-interest.
Given the AGB guidelines, perhaps Massachusetts should try again. While the Board of
Regents is still struggling to organize itself and define its role, the presence of a public-
private forum as a coherent, consistent voice for higher education could be a powerful
factor in the formation of sound education policy. Such a forum would remain, of course,
an interest group, however enlightened and deserving. But it could be a knowledgeable
initiator of a sound distributive policy, and it could provide a determined buffer against
inappropriate intervention from the external political system. In the present circum-
stances, with the lessons of the past taken to heart and the deficiencies of the current
structure acknowledged, a public-private forum might again invoke the spirit of Williams-
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board in favor of his own position, the governor was able to bring the board to a reconsideration
of the Collins appointment. As a result, in early September 1986, the board overturned its earlier
vote in support of Collins. Almost simultaneously, Regent James Howell was accused of a con-
flict of interest by the state Ethics Commission. In 1986, legislation was passed which clarified
the relationship between the law establishing the Board of Regents and the law establishing the
Ethics Commission. This legislation was vetoed by the governor, but the governor's veto was
subsequently overridden by the General Court.
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